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We introduce two new monotonicity properties for core concepts: single-
valued solution concepts that always select a core allocation whenever the
game is balanced (has a nonempty core). We present one result of impos-
sibility for one of the properties and we pose several open questions for the
second property. The open questions arise because the most important
core concepts (the nucleolus and the per capita nucleolus) do not satisfy
the property even in the class of convex games.
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11 Introduction
Young (1985) formulates an impossibility result for the problem of ￿nding core
concepts satisfying monotonicity1 in the domain of balanced TU games. This
result opens up two paths of research: One is to restrict the search for monotonic
core concepts to certain classes of games2. The other, is to de￿ne new properties
of monotonicity (weaker than the one formulated by Young) and to deal with
the class of all TU balanced games. This paper discusses this second path.
In considering new monotonicity properties we ￿rst analyze the compatibil-
ity between monotonicity and core belonging. Only when such a compatibility
exists do we require a core concept to be monotonic. Following this approach we
introduce two new properties: strong core monotonicity and core monotonicity.
For the ￿rst property we provide a result of impossibility. For the second prop-
erty we pose an open question once we have checked that core concepts such as
nucleolus and per capita nucleolus do not satisfy the property.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 TU Games
A cooperative n-person game in characteristic function form is a pair (N;v),
where N is a ￿nite set of n elements and v : 2N ! R is a real-valued function
in the family 2N of all subsets of N with v(;) = 0: Elements of N are called
players and the real-valued function v the characteristic function of the game.
Any subset S of N is called a coalition. The number of players in S is denoted
by jSj. Given S ￿ N we denote by NnS the set of players of N that are not in
S: Let N be a set of players and ￿0 a class of games. If there is no confusion, we
write v 2 ￿0 instead of (N;v) 2 ￿0: A distribution of v(N) among the players
is a real-valued vector x 2 RN where xi is the payo⁄ assigned by x to player i.
A distribution satisfying xi ￿ v(i) for all i 2 N is called an imputation and the
set of imputations is denoted by I(v): We denote
P
i2S
xi by x(S). The core of a
game is the set of imputations that cannot be blocked by any coalition, i.e.
C(v) = fx 2 I(v) : x(S) ￿ v(S) for all S ￿ Ng:
1See Section 2 and 3 for formal de￿nitions of core concept and monotonicity.
2This also can be seen as a weakening of the core requirements in the sense that we only
search in games that have a special core.
2A game with a non-empty core is called a balanced game. Player i is a veto
player if v(S) = 0 for all S where player i is not present. A balanced game with
at least one veto player is called a veto balanced game. We denote by ￿B the
class of balanced games and by ￿BV the class of veto balanced games.
A solution ￿ in a class of games ￿0 is a correspondence that associates a
set ￿(N;v) in RN with every game (N;v) in ￿0 such that x(N) ￿ v(N) for all
x 2 ￿(N;v). This solution is e¢ cient if this inequality holds with equality. The
solution is single-valued if the set contains a unique element for each game in
the class.
Given x 2 RN the excess of a coalition S with respect to x in a game v
is de￿ned as e(S;x) := v(S) ￿ x(S): Let ￿(x) be the vector of all excesses at
x arranged in non-increasing order. The lexicographic order ￿L between two
vectors x and y is de￿ned by x ￿L y if there exists an index k such that xl = yl
for all l < k and xk < yk and the weak lexicographic order ￿Lby x ￿L y if
x ￿L y or x = y:
Schmeidler (1969) introduced the nucleolus of a game v; denoted by ￿(v); as
the unique imputation that lexicographically minimizes the vector of non in-
creasingly ordered excesses over the set of imputations. In formula:
f￿(N;v)g = fx 2 I(N;v)j￿(x) ￿L ￿(y) for all y 2 I(N;v)g:
For any game v with a non-empty imputation set, the nucleolus is a single-
valued solution, is contained in the kernel and lies in the core provided that the
core is non-empty.
The per capita nucleolus is de￿ned analogously by using the concept of per




In this paper, we study solution concepts that select precisely one core allo-
cation for each balanced game. We call such concepts core concepts.
2.2 On monotonicity properties
We present some monotonicity properties for single-valued solution concepts.
3Let v;w 2 ￿0, such that for all T containing player i; v(T) ￿ w(T); and for
all S ￿ Nnfig v(S) = w(S) : We say that game w is monotonic with respect to
game v and player i.
Let ￿ be a single-valued solution in a class of games ￿0.
We say that solution ￿ satis￿es monotonicity if for all v;w 2 ￿0, such
that w is monotonic with respect to game v and player i then ￿i(w) ￿ ￿i(v):
We say that solution ￿ satis￿es N-monotonicity (Meggido, 1974) if for all
v;w 2 ￿0, such that for all S 6= N; v(S) = w(S) and v(N) < w(N); then for all
i 2 N; ￿i(v) ￿ ￿i(w):
We say that solution ￿ satis￿es strong N-monotonicity if for all v;w 2 ￿0,
such that for all S 6= N; v(S) = w(S) and v(N) < w(N); then for all i;j 2 N;
￿i(w) ￿ ￿i(v) = ￿j(w) ￿ ￿j(v) ￿ 0:
Clearly, monotonicity implies N-monotonicity.
Young (1985) shows that in the class of balanced games there is no core
concept that satis￿es monotonicity. The result is presented by means of two
balanced games with only one core allocation each. Therefore in these games a
core concept must choose the allocation contained in the core. To some extent,
we can say that in this case the core restrictions do not allow a core concept
to be monotonic. This observation motivates the following note. We investi-
gate new monotonicity properties that require for some compatibility between
monotonicity and core belonging.
In the class of convex games the Shapley value is a core concept that satis￿es
monotonicity. Arin and Feltkamp (2007) show that in the class of veto balanced
games there are several core concepts that satisfy monotonicity. It is also shown
that the nucleolus and the per capita nucleolus do not satisfy the property.
3 On core monotonicity
We introduce new core monotonicity properties3. The idea of the new proper-
ties is that a core concept should be monotonic whenever core restrictions are
compatible with this monotonicity.
De￿nition 1 Let v;w 2 ￿0, such that game w is monotonic with respect to
game v and player i. We say that game w has a monotonic core with respect to
3We de￿ne the properties for core concepts.
4game v and player i if there exist x 2 C(w) and z 2 C(v) such that xi ￿ zi:
The existence of a monotonic core is certainly a necessary condition for
the monotonicity of a core concept. If this requirement is not satis￿ed any
core concept must violate monotonicity. In the example given by Young the
requirement is not satis￿ed.
Following this observation we de￿ne strong core monotonicity.
De￿nition 2 Strong core monotonicity: A core concept ￿ in ￿0 is strongly
core monotonic if for all v;w 2 ￿0 such that:
1.- game w is monotonic with respect to game v and player i
2.- game w has a monotonic core with respect to game v and player i
it holds that; ￿i(w) ￿ ￿i(v):
Note that if a core concept is monotonic then is strongly core monotonic.
Theorem 3 In the class of balanced games there is no core concept that satis￿es
strong core monotonicity .
















v(S) if S 6= Nnfig
24 if S = Nnfig
where i 2 N: The games wi are monotonic with respect to to game v and player
l; l 6= i: They also have a monotonic core with respect to game v and player l;
l 6= i: For the games w1 and w2 we need to consider the only core allocation of
the two games, z1 = (0;0;12;12) and for games w3 and w4 we need to consider
the allocation z3 = (12;12;0;0):
Let ￿ a core concept satisfying strong core monotonicity. By applying strong
core monotonicity between games w1 and v we conclude that ￿(v) = z1: By
applying strong core monotonicity between games w3 and v we conclude that
￿(v) = z3:
In this example, core restrictions do not allow a core concept to behave
monotonically from game v to games w1 and w3: We try to ￿nd a de￿nition of
5core monotonicity that requires monotonic behavior of a core concept whenever
core restrictions allow such behavior.
Let N be a set of players and ￿0 a class of games. By a pair (w;i(w)) we
refer to a game w 2 ￿0 and a player i 2 N associated to game w:
De￿nition 4 Let N be a set of players and v 2 ￿0. We say that game v has
an extendable monotonic core if there exists z 2 C(v) such that for any pair
(w;i(w)) where w is a monotonic game with respect to v and i(w) we can ￿nd
x 2 C(w) such that xi(w) ￿ zi(w):
In the class of convex games any game has an extendable monotonic core
since, in this class, the Shapley value is a monotonic core concept.
In the above proof it is immediate that game v does not have an extendable
monotonic core in the class of all balanced games. The following property
incorporates this new aspect of the compatibility between monotonicity and
core belonging.
De￿nition 5 Extendable core monotonicity: A core concept ￿ on ￿0 is
extendable core monotonic if for all v;w 2 ￿0 such that:
1.- game w is monotonic with respect to game v and player i
2.- game w has a monotonic core with respect to game v and player i
3.- ￿i(w) < ￿i(v)
then game v does not have an extendable monotonic core.
This de￿nition is not completely satisfactory as the following example illus-
trates4.
















v(S) if S 6= N
28 if S = N .
It seems clear that a core concept ￿ such that ￿i(v) > ￿i(q) for a player i
cannot be considered as a monotonic core concept. But since game v has no
4The property does not imply N-monotonicity. That is, a solution can be monotonic in
the sense of De￿nition 5 but violates N-monotonicity.
6extendable monotonic core according to the de￿nition above, we cannot claim
that this solution ￿ is not extendable core monotonic using the above facts.
In this example, it does not seem reasonable to argue that game v has
no extendable monotonic core in order to justify non-monotonic behavior of a
core concept while moving from game v to game q: For such an argument, it
seems necessary to show that game q is necessary to imply that game v has no
extendable monotonic core. This idea is formalized in the property we call core
monotonicity.
De￿nition 6 Let v 2 ￿0. We say that game v has an extendable monotonic
core with respect to the list of pairs (wi;j(wi))i=1;:::;k if:
1.- for any pair (wi;j(wi)) it holds that wi 2 ￿0 and wi is a monotonic game
with respect to v and j(wi):
2.- there exists z 2 C(v) such that for any pair (wi;j(wi)) we can ￿nd
x 2 C(wi) such that xj(wi) ￿ zj(wi):
Note that, in the proof of Theorem 3, game v has no extendable monotonic
core with respect to the list of pairs: (w1;2); (w2;1); (w4;3) and (w3;4):
De￿nition 7 Core monotonicity: A core concept ￿ in ￿0 is core monotonic
if for all v;w 2 ￿0 such that:
1.- game w is monotonic with respect to game v and player i
2.- game w has a monotonic core with respect to game v and player i
3.- ￿i(w) < ￿i(v)
then there exists a list of pairs (wl;j(wl))l=1;:::;k, such that
1.- game v has an extendable monotonic core for the list of pairs (wl;j(wl))l=1;:::;k.
2,.- game v has no extendable monotonic core for the list of pairs (w;i);
(wl;j(wl))l=1;:::;k.
The property means that any violation of the requirement of monotonicity
should be justi￿ed. If such a violation occurs between two games, from game
v to game w, then game w should be a member of a minimal list of games for
which game v has no extendable monotonic core. Minimality implies that for
any other subset of the list of games, game v has an extendable monotonic core.
Remark 8 If a core concept is strongly core monotonic then is core monotonic.
7In the class of balanced games there exist core concepts that satisfy N-
monotonicity such as the per capita nucleolus. Therefore core restrictions and N-
monotonicity are compatible. The following proposition relates core monotonic-
ity and N-monotonicity.
Proposition 9 Core monotonicity implies N-monotonicity.
Proof. Assume that there exists a core concept ￿ that is core monotonic
but not N-monotonic. Then there exist two balanced games (N;v) and (N;w)
such that:
1.- w(N) > v(N) and w(S) = v(S) for any other coalition S:
2.- game w has a monotonic core with respect to game v and player i
3.- ￿i(w) < ￿i(v)
4.- there exists a list of pairs ((N;ql);j(ql))l=1;:::;k, such that:
a.- game v has an extendable monotonic core for the list of pairs ((N;ql);j(ql))l=1;:::;k.
b.- game v has not an extendable monotonic core for the list of pairs ((N;w):i);
((N;ql);j(ql))l=1;:::;k.
Let z be a core allocation in game (N;v) that allows game v to have an
extendable core with respect to the list of pairs ((N;ql);j(ql))l=1;:::;k: Adding
the pair ((N;w);i(w)) to the list does not change this fact since the allocation




jNj ) is a core allocation in game w and satis￿es
xi ￿ zi for all i 2 N:
It is well-known that in the class of balanced games, convex games and veto
balanced games the nucleolus does not satisfy N-monotonicity. (See Hokari
(2000) for the case of convex games and Arin and Feltkamp (2005) for the case
of veto balanced games.)
Corollary 10 In the class of balanced games, convex games and veto balanced
games the nucleolus is not core monotonic.
The per capita nucleolus is a core concept that satis￿es N-monotonicity in
the class of all balanced games, which is why some authors consider it a good
candidate when seeking to select monotonic core allocations. The following re-
sult shows that the per capita nucleolus violates core monotonicity and therefore,
even if it does satisfy N-monotonicity, it can hardly be seen as a monotonic
core concept (at least in the class of all balanced games and in the subclass of
veto balanced games).
8Proposition 11 In the class of balanced games the per capita nucleolus is not
core monotonic.
Proof. Let N = f1;2;3:4:5;6g a set of players and consider the following





4 if 1 2 S and jSj = 5







8 if S = Nnf6g
12 if S = N
v(S) otherwise
The per capita nucleolus selects the allocation (5;1;1;1;1;1) in the ￿rst game






21): Therefore, the per capita
nucleolus is not monotonic since player 1 receives a lower payo⁄ in the second
game. The pair (w;1) is not necessary in a list of pairs in order to make game
v a game without an extendable monotonic core with respect to these pairs. If
given a list of pairs we have that game v has an extendable monotonic core with
respect to that list, adding the pair (w;1) to the list does not change this fact
since the allocation x = (12;0;0;0;0;0) is a core allocation in the game w and
satis￿es x1 ￿ z1 for all z 2 C(v):
Note that the proof is constructed using veto balanced convex games.
Corollary 12 In the class of veto balanced games and in the class of convex
games the per capita nucleolus is not core monotonic.
4 Results and open questions
The foregoing analysis suggests the following general question:
Problem 13 Are there any core monotonic core concept in the class of balanced
games?
It also suggests several other questions concerning classes of balanced games.
In the class of convex games the Shapley value is a core concept and therefore
a core monotonic core concept. But, in general, the Shapley value is not a core
concept. This motivates the following question: if there are core monotonic core
concepts in the class of balanced games do those core concepts coincide with
9the Shapley value in the class of convex games? The answer is given by the
following example








v(S) if S 6= N
8 if S = N
The game w is convex and therefore its Shapley value, (3; 5
3; 5
3; 5
3) is a core
allocation. The only core allocation of the game (N;v) is (4;0;0;0): Note that
game w is monotonic with respect to game v and any player in N. Therefore a
monotonic core concept does not select an allocation where player 1 receives a
payo⁄ lower than 4 and therefore such a core concept will not coincide with the
Shapley value of the game.
In the class of veto balanced games there are core monotonic core concepts
(see Arin and Feltkamp (2007)). The solution concepts analyzed in this paper
are not de￿ned in the class of balanced games and therefore a similar question
can be asked. That is, given a core monotonic concept de￿ned on the class of
veto balanced games, say ￿; are there any core monotonic core concepts in the
class of balanced games coinciding with ￿ in the class of veto balanced games?
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